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Abstract 
To trust someone is to have expectations of their behaviour; distrust often involves 
disappointed expectations.  But healthy trust and distrust require a good understanding of 
which expectations are reasonable, and which are not.  In this paper I discuss the limits of 
trustworthiness by drawing upon recent studies of trust in the context of defensive medicine, 
biobanking, and CPR decisions.  
 
1. Introduction 
Two issues commonly arise when we think about trust, in the doctor-patient relationship or 
elsewhere.  The first issue is how to generate and maintain trusting relationships, both for 
their own sake and for the practical benefits which can flow from enhanced trust.  The second 
issue is how to avoid the trap of trusting the untrustworthy, without falling into the opposite 
trap of distrusting the trustworthy.  A third issue is less commonly addressed, but doing so 
can help shed light on the first two.  This is the issue of how best to understand, judge and 
communicate the limits of both trustworthiness and untrustworthiness: not everything we do 
or say reflects upon our trustworthiness.  I will explore this issue by drawing together some 
threads from otherwise-diverse studies of trust in medicine.   
2.  Trust, Reliance and Distrust 
Trusting someone involves relying upon him or her to act as you wish, or to provide you with 
the information you need.  But not every instance of reliance involves trust.  Whilst I rely 
upon the refuse collectors to wake me up on weekdays with their early-morning shouting and 
clanking, this doesn’t mean that I trust them to wake me, any more than my reliance upon the 
dawn chorus to wake me on weekends means that I trust the birds.  As Annette Baier points 
out [1], the attitude of trust is distinctively linked to the feeling of betrayal: when my trust is 
misplaced, I may feel betrayed, angry, perhaps resentful.  If my spouse promises to wake me, 
then fails to do so, that may be a breach of trust, something which prompts resentment, not 
just disappointment, whereas if the refuse collectors or the birds are quiet one morning, I am 
not entitled to resent them, or to think in terms of betrayal.   
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Lack of trust needn’t amount to distrust: I rely upon the refuse collectors without trusting 
them, but I don’t distrust them either.   Instead, I appreciate that waking me in the morning is 
not part of the refuse collectors’ job description (no matter how reliably they wake me), they 
do not realise that I am relying upon them, and I cannot reasonably demand that they take my 
need for an alarm call into account.  Likewise, of course, with the birds in my garden. 
When we think about whether to trust, or to distrust, it is tempting to focus on cases in which 
it’s clear that one or the other attitude is appropriate and so our main challenge is to work out 
which of the two to opt for.  But it’s important also to bear in mind the difference between 
situations in which either trust or distrust is appropriate, and situations in which neither trust 
nor distrust is appropriate.  If we trust in situations where neither trust nor distrust is 
appropriate – if I start to trust the refuse collectors to wake me, rather than merely relying 
upon them – then we risk imposing inappropriate demands on others, and we create 
unnecessary opportunities to feel betrayed by those others.   
In which situations is neither trust nor distrust appropriate?  Sometimes, neither trust nor 
distrust is appropriate simply because we do not have enough information to decide, and 
there is no pressing reason to plump for one option.  But in other situations, matters can be 
completely clear, and yet still neither trust nor distrust is appropriate.  The dawn chorus 
provides a simple example: I neither trust nor distrust the birds to wake me at weekends, not 
because of any uncertainty about the situation, but because I understand that I am not in that 
kind of relationship with the birds, and they cannot respond to my wishes. 
Different philosophers have different views about exactly what it takes for trust-or-distrust to 
be appropriate (I outline my own position in [2]).  But a common theme is that it is 
appropriate to trust-or-distrust someone with regard to domains in which she has an 
obligation to you, or has undertaken some commitment to you, or can reasonably be 
demanded or required to act in a certain way.  Trust is appropriate when the person meets her 
obligations, and distrust is appropriate when the person does not. 
With regard to one and the same person, some matters can be an issue of trust-or-distrust, 
whilst others are not.  It is appropriate for me to trust (or distrust, as the case may be) the 
refuse collectors with respect to removing the rubbish effectively, even though it is not 
appropriate for me to trust (or distrust) them to wake me up in time for work.  Even in the 
most intimate relationships, it is healthy to keep some domains beyond the reach of trust or 
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distrust: the whole point of a spontaneous gift or act of generosity is that it goes beyond what 
we are obliged or required to do. 
Mistakes about the proper limits of both trust and distrust can lead to an increase in distrust, 
and so it is worthwhile to explore how these limits can be established and communicated.  
Several recent studies have examined different medical contexts in which these issues take on 
great importance, and I will discuss these in turn. 
3. Defensive Medicine 
One challenge for both patients and doctors is to establish the proper boundaries of the 
doctor’s responsibility.  Philip Nickel argues that the phenomenon of ‘defensive medicine’ is 
in part a reaction to over-reaching trust directed by patients towards doctors [3].  If a patient 
trusts a doctor to prescribe antibiotics for the common cold, to order costly scans, or to offer 
specialist referral for minor aches and pains, then the doctor’s ‘failure’ to do so can be 
resented as a breach of trust.  Nickel suggests that, knowing the cost of such ‘failure’, doctors 
may attempt to live up to patients’ trust even when this is not medically appropriate.  As he 
writes, ‘It is important to realize that misplaced trust can be bad, not because moral 
expectations are disappointed, but because they are met’ ([3], p. 359). 
In such cases, if the patient’s trust is misplaced, this is not because the patient should instead 
distrust the doctor.  Instead, it would be preferable for the patient to recognise that the 
doctor’s willingness to offer antibiotics for a cold is not a measure of the doctor’s 
trustworthiness at all.  (Analogously, I need to recognise that, just like the birds, the refuse 
collectors’ success or failure in waking me up is not an indication of their trustworthiness or 
untrustworthiness.)   
Extending Nickel’s argument, we see that misplaced distrust can also be bad: if a patient 
believes that such interventions are appropriate, and thus distrusts the doctor who resists the 
practice of defensive medicine, this can create a downwards spiral in their relationship.  A 
first step in theorising about trust and distrust is to understand the difference between 
situations in which one or other of these attitudes is appropriate, and situations in which 
neither trust nor distrust is appropriate.  Likewise, in practical situations one way of 
enhancing trust relationships is to improve communication and clarity about what can 
reasonably be expected: how can a trustworthy doctor or other medical professional be 
expected to behave?  Lowering expectations may help to heighten trust. 
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How can this be achieved?  Where a strong trust relationship already exists, a patient may be 
prepared to accept the doctor’s own account of what can reasonably be expected of her, to 
accept that a particular diagnostic test is unnecessary, for example.  But where trust is lacking, 
the doctor’s own account may be unpersuasive: to a more suspicious mind, it seems natural 
that an untrustworthy practitioner would defend her own practice as trustworthy.  She would 
say that, wouldn’t she!  Public information initiatives can help resolve this.  For example, in 
2012 Public Health England produced a leaflet in collaboration with the Royal College of 
General Practitioners and other bodies, intended to explain to patients why their doctor has 
not prescribed antibiotics for a condition such as common cold or sore throat.  Where 
successful, such a leaflet can set the individual doctor’s decision into a broader context of 
institutional trustworthiness. 
4. Participation in Biobanking 
Johnsson, Helgesson, Hansson and Eriksson examine issues of trust in the process whereby 
doctors secure consent from their patients for the inclusion of their samples in biobanks, 
focusing especially on the Swedish experience [4].  The doctor who informs the patient about 
the process, and obtains consent, is typically not amongst the researchers who will use the 
biobank resources.  Instead, the doctor is the recipient of ‘proxy trust’, based on a pre-
existing relationship with the patient, with regard to future actions and research which the 
doctor does not personally undertake, monitor or control. 
Johnsson et al explore various aspects of this situation, but most relevant for my concerns is 
their discussion of inappropriate trust and the ‘therapeutic misconception’ [5].  People have a 
persistent tendency to expect that biobank research will be of personal benefit to them, either 
by helping to treat a condition from which they suffer, or else by revealing risk factors and 
preventative measures.  In practice, such benefits to individual donors rarely occur.  Johnsson 
et al identify the fact that donation is suggested by the patient’s doctor as a key source of the 
therapeutic misconception, and they explain this as a distinctive type of error in trust: ‘The 
patient mistakenly trusts the doctor always to act in his best interests’ ([4], p. 8).   
The patient correctly (let’s suppose) trusts the doctor to act in the patient’s best interests with 
regard to medical procedures, but mistakenly extends that trust to encompass every aspect of 
his interaction with the doctor, assuming that the doctor would not have suggested biobank 
donation if it were not in the patient’s best interests.  Johnsson et al’s point is not that the 
doctor is untrustworthy in suggesting biobank donation, but rather that being a trustworthy 
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doctor does not require one to suggest biobank donation only if it is likely to benefit the 
patient personally.  ‘To…expect of one’s doctor to recommend research participation only if 
it benefits oneself is inappropriate; it is to demand too much’ ([4], p. 8). 
If Johnsson et al’s analysis is correct, then this provides us with a second illustration of 
problems arising from misunderstandings about the proper scope of trust or distrust.  Nickel’s 
discussion of defensive medicine showed how patients may extend trust-or-distrust beyond 
appropriate limits, and biobank donation under the therapeutic misconception has a similar 
structure.  In the case of defensive medicine we saw that institutional communication about 
the appropriate limits of trust-or-distrust may be more effective than personal communication 
from the doctor alone: there is something unstable about a conversation in which someone 
asks us to take his word for it about the limits of his own trustworthiness.  Likewise, it will be 
difficult for an individual doctor to explain that he is not focused on the patient’s interests in 
suggesting a donation, without thereby undermining his own perceived trustworthiness.  
Rather, this clarification of reasonable expectations must take place ‘through public 
engagement and debate’ ([4], p. 8). 
Heather Widdows provides an in-depth analysis of the role of trust in the ethics and 
governance of biobank research [6].  The model of ‘informed consent’ is a bad fit for this 
area, since at the point of donation it is simply not possible to foresee or explain the specific 
research which will be carried out.  A looser notion of ‘broad consent’ – consent to whatever 
research may eventually be dreamt up – may avoid the practical difficulties involved with 
informed consent, but seems completely unconstraining, and incapable of sustaining an 
ongoing ethical framework.  The ‘trust model’, as explicitly adopted by the UK Biobank, 
involves broad consent but goes beyond it.  The recipient of donations is understood to have 
ongoing responsibility of stewardship and trusteeship, aimed at ensuring that donations are 
used only for the stated purposes of the biobank. 
We can think of such statements of purpose as circumscribing the proper domain of trust or 
distrust for donors to the biobank.  The UK Biobank undertakes to ‘build a major resource 
that can support a diverse range of research intended to improve the prevention, diagnosis, 
and treatment of illness, and the promotion of health throughout society’ ([7], p. 3). 
Intriguingly, Widdows shows how those associated with the UK Biobank take care to stress 
the generality and futurity of potential benefits; we can see this as an attempt to dispel the 
therapeutic misconception. 
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This trust model of ethics and governance focuses on trust given by donors to the biobank 
and its associated researchers, rather than the trust between a patient and the doctor who 
suggests the donation.  Nevertheless, it again emphasises the practical importance of 
establishing where responsibility lies, and the boundaries of what can sensibly be promised, 
as ways of improving trust relationships. 
5. Decisions about CPR 
Barbara Hayes investigates the importance of trust in decision-making about 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), drawing on interviews with thirty-three doctors and 
nurses in Australia [8].  Interviewees talked about their experiences of discussing CPR with 
patients and their families, in order to make an advance decision about how to proceed.  Such 
discussions are of course delicate and potentially distressing, not least because they require 
patients and their families to think directly about death and suffering, and to make 
momentous decisions under uncertainty about outcomes.  A key challenge is that the 
prospects for successful CPR are typically much lower than members of the public expect.  
As Hayes points out, successful CPR is regularly portrayed in TV dramas, and it is taught as 
part of basic first-aid training, perhaps increasing the perception that it is a straightforward, 
non-intrusive intervention. 
Trust was a recurring theme in the research interviews.  Doctors and nurses saw it as crucial 
that patients and families trusted them as sources of medical knowledge, but also that they 
were trusted to have good intentions and moral characters.  They also acknowledged the 
obstacles to achieving trust in such circumstances, noting that CPR discussions could actually 
undermine trust, especially if the default starting assumption is that CPR will inevitably be 
given (perhaps because it is perceived as basic first-aid): we expect doctors to bring us 
suggestions for treatment, not suggestions to withhold treatment.   
As we have already seen with defensive medicine, and biobank donation, there is scope here 
for mistakes about the proper bounds of trust and distrust, i.e. mistakes about what kind of 
behaviour can reasonably be expected from a medical professional.  Some interviewees spoke 
of their perceptions of cultural differences, regarding families and/or patients with experience 
of overseas medical regimes.  In one (unspecified) country, it was reportedly essential to 
continue visibly attempting CPR until the patient’s family arrived to witness the attempts, 
even when the patient had already died.  Hayes remarks: ‘Discussions by Australian doctors 
about withholding non-beneficial CPR may well be looked upon with suspicion and distrust 
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if this is not the patient’s experience or expectation of how things are done in their country of 
origin.’ ([8], p. 18).    
 
This can be seen as an (understandable) error about what it is reasonable to trust a doctor to 
do: from the Australian perspective, it is not appropriate to attempt CPR at all costs, or to 
administer it beyond the point of death, and so ‘failure’ to do this does not reflect any lack of 
trustworthiness on the part of the doctor.  For those patients or families who may see things 
differently, this is indeed a matter for trust or distrust.  Moreover, opening up a conversation 
about whether or not to attempt CPR may be seen by the Australian practitioners as a 
requirement of trustworthiness, whereas even raising the topic for discussion may indicate 
untrustworthiness to some patients or families.    
 
What strategies are available to assist communication about the appropriate scope of 
trustworthiness?  As before, it is difficult for an individual to self-justify if trust is not already 
established, and widespread publicity about the limitations of CPR might undermine other 
medical goals.  Hayes stresses the importance of developing trust beforehand: ‘Recognising 
the importance of trust makes evident the need to establish a level of trust before embarking 
on a discussion about withholding CPR. This is necessary in order to minimise the potential 
harm that may arise from this discussion.’  ([8], p. 120)  Many nurses reported that they were 
more trusted than doctors, and this may be connected to their greater opportunity to become 
familiar with patients and families before the difficult conversation must take place; both 
doctors and nurses emphasised the value of taking time over these conversations, and the 
challenge of finding enough time.  
 
Zoë Fritz et al report on a UK trial of Universal Form of Treatment Options (UFTOs), in 
place of the more standard Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Orders 
(DNACPRs) [9].  There are many interesting differences between these two pro-formas, but 
for present purposes one point is striking: decisions regarding DNACPRs had to be initiated 
by either physician or patient, whilst in contrast an UFTO was completed for every patient 
admitted to the ward, and included positive instructions about treatments to be administered, 
as well as those to be withheld.  This ‘universal’ approach might serve to normalise 
discussion around CPR, reducing the risk that even raising the question will undermine the 
perceived trustworthiness of the physician.    
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6. Conclusions 
The three examples I have considered all concern patients’ trust in doctors, or other 
healthcare professionals.  Nevertheless, trust is rarely a one-way street, and there are also 
important questions about the degree to which doctors can or should trust their patients [10], 
and indeed the ways in which doctors’ interactions with patients can enhance or diminish 
patients’ self-trust, with possible consequences for patient autonomy [11].  In any discussion 
of trust and distrust, however, it is useful to bear in mind the risks associated with 
miscommunication about what can reasonably expected of either party: misplaced trust can 
be a dangerous thing for both truster and trustee. 
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